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THE ABYSS OF RACISM
J. Thomas Sullivan*
It is important to recall what motivated Members of this
Court at the genesis of our modern capitalpunishment case
law. Furman v. Georgia was decided in an atmosphere
suffused with concern about race bias in the administration
of the death penalty-particularlyin Southern States.1

I. THE BARRIER TO EXAMINING SYSTEMIC RACISM IN THE
IMPOSITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Fifteen years after Furman v. Georgia, Justice Powell,
writing for the majority in McCleskey v. Kemp,3 expressly
*Professor of Law, William H. Bowen School of Law, University of Arkansas at Little
Rock; Founding Editor, The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process. This essay is the
third in a series devoted to the continuing problem of racial discrimination in the
administration of the death penalty. See J. Thomas Sullivan, Lethal Discrimination, 26
Harv. J. Racial & Ethnic Just. 69 (2010); J. Thomas Sullivan, Lethal Discrimination2:
Repairing the Remedies for Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing, 26 Harv. J.

Racial & Ethnic Just. 113 (2010). It reflects a perspective shaped by my representation of
capital defendants sentenced to death in trial, appellate, and post-conviction proceedings in
Texas, New Mexico, and Arkansas. The essay is not intended to be comprehensive, the
number of important capital decisions and the published commentary being virtually
overwhelming; instead, it offers one view of the death penalty. Its title is drawn from
Justice Murphy's dissenting opinion in Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the
decision upholding the internment of individuals of Japanese descent, including American
citizens, after the start of World War II.
1. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 479 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
2. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Georgia death row inmate Warren McCleskey had the rather
amazing distinction of seeing two cases involving his claim reviewed on the merits by the
United States Supreme Court. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). He was
executed in 1991 after the Court held that his second federal habeas petition demonstrated
an "abuse of the writ." Id. at 470; see Death Penalty Information Center, Searchable
Execution Database, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions (enter "Warren
McCleskey" in "name" box and click enter to see execution details) (accessed Oct. 11,
2012; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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rejected the equal protection argument that had persuaded4
Justice Douglas to vote against the death penalty in Furman.
Despite empirical evidence demonstrating that death sentences
were more frequently imposed on African-Americans than on
white defendants, particularly when they were convicted of
murdering white victims, Justice Powell concluded for the
majority that the empirical data demonstrated only a "risk" that
black defendants were subject to racial discrimination in the
imposition of the death penalty. 5 Under McCleskey, showing a
statistical disparity in imposition of the death penalty by race is
not sufficient to establish a claim of racial discrimination.
Instead, the McCleskey Court held that "to prevail under the
Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must prove that the
'6
decisionmakersin his case acted with discriminatorypurpose.
The significance of Justice Powell's opinion in McCleskey
cannot be overstated.7 The McCleskey majority concluded that
the apparent disparities shown in McCleskey's statistical
evidence reflected neither an arbitrary nor a racially
discriminatory application of the penalty, the death sentences
imposed being based upon evidence developed in support of
aggravating circumstances in each case. 8 Consequently, attacks
on capital sentences as improperly influenced by racial bias have
consistently failed when based on statistical evidence
demonstrating greater use of the death penalty either against
4. In joining the plurality striking down existing state capital sentencing statutes in
Furman, Justice Douglas categorically rejected death penalty statutes that provided for
discretionary sentencing by juries or judges because of the inherent risk that death
sentences would be imposed in a discriminatory fashion:
[W]e know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty
enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the
accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a
member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social
position may be in a more protected position.
Furman,408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).
5. 481 U.S. at 291 n. 7 (emphasis in original); see generally id. at 291-92.
6. Id. at 292 (some emphasis added).
7. The decision remains problematic and deeply troubling for litigants, their lawyers,
and members of the public concerned about the influence of racial bias in capital
sentencing. See e.g. McCleskey v. Kemp 25 Years Later, http://mccleskyvkemp.com
(collecting and reflecting discussion throughout twenty-five-year history of decision)
(accessed July 13, 2012; copy of main page on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
8. 481 U.S. at 286-91.
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black defendants or in cross-racial cases involving white
victims. 9 Thus, McCleskey has effectively discouraged or
undermined attempts to use statistical evidence to demonstrate
systemic, constitutional flaws in the system of capital
prosecution and sentencing. 10
After leaving the Court, Justice Powell reportedly reversed
his thinking on the death penalty and stated that he regretted his
vote in McCleskey.11 Yet the decision remains an almost
insurmountable hurdle for litigants challenging capital
sentencing on disparate-imposition grounds even though the
statistical evidence can be taken to suggest that death sentences
are discriminatorily imposed whether the focus is the race of the
defendant (most often black) or the race of the victim (most
often white).
Whether the statistical evidence actually supports a
conclusion that the death penalty is applied discriminatorily
remains subject to debate. 12 What is evident, however, is that the
9. 481 U.S. at 286-87.
10. See e.g. Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256, 1269 (10th Cir. 1986) (attacking
Utah's capital sentencing scheme based upon disproportionate number of African
Americans on death row and the fact that all victims in the small number of cases in which
death had been imposed were white). In Andrews, the petitioner pointed out that at the time
all black defendants eligible for capital punishment had killed Caucasian victims and all
had been sentenced to death. The court found the population-seven individuals on death
row, four of whom were black-statistically insignificant, despite the disproportionally
smaller percentage of the state's total population who were black, and also concluded that
the petitioner's evidence failed to demonstrate that the individuals sentenced to death were,
in fact, subjected to any systematic policy of racial discrimination. Id. Significantly, the
Andrews court did affirm, however, that evidence of racial discrepancies in imposition of
the death penalty could afford a basis for relief, observing that "a pattern of discriminatory
or otherwise arbitrary sentencing decisions in capital cases can violate the Constitution
regardless of intent," and that "(u]nlike the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of 'equal
laws, not equal results,' . . . the Eighth Amendment protects against unacceptably
inconsistent outcomes." Id. at 1267 (citation omitted). But the Andrews court also found
that the petitioner had not made a sufficient showing of discriminatory impact in
imposition of capital sentences in Utah at the time. Id. at 1269.
11. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 451 (Charles Scribner's Sons
1994); Mark A. Graber, Judicial Recantation, 45 Syracuse L. Rev. 807, 807 (1994) ("Had
Justice Powell seen the light while on the bench, the Supreme Court would have dealt a
crippling blow to the death penalty in McCleskey."). Justice Powell's repudiation of the
death penalty in retirement, of course, had no impact upon the precedential value of his
opinion for the Court in McCleskey.
12. Statistics kept by the Death Penalty Information Center show that fifty-six percent
of the defendants executed since 1976 have been white, thirty-four percent black, and eight
percent Hispanic. Death Penalty Information Center, Facts about the Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (May 30, 2012). However, the
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demographic breakdown in the use of the death penalty is
sufficient to warrant inquiry. What is also evident is that the
Court's decision in McCleskey precludes capital defendants'
raising the death penalty's relative use as a basis for federal
constitutional challenges. And this has been the case for a long
time: Justice Blackmun, discussing McCleskey after seven years
of seeing the case invoked to prevent capital defendants from
presenting evidence of systemic bias,' 3 observed that
[d]espite . .

staggering evidence of racial prejudice

infecting Georgia's capital sentencing scheme, the majority
turned its back on McCleskey's claims, apparently troubled
by the fact that Georgia had instituted more procedural and
substantive safeguards than most other States since
Furman, but was still unable to stamp out the virus of
racism.

disparity between black and white defendants sentenced to death reflects a more troubling
reality. Statistics compiled by the Department of Justice, for instance, show that in 2005,
the national homicide offender rate for blacks was seven times higher than for whites and
that blacks were victims of homicides at six times the rate for whites. Department of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide Trends in the U.S.: Trends by Race,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/homicide/race.cfm (June 21, 2012). Thus, the apparent
disproportionality of capital sentencing between blacks and whites might simply reflect the
disparity in offender rates. If so, the apparent disproportional imposition of capital
sentences is explained as a function of relatively higher offender rates for blacks, rebutting
claims that statistical analysis serves to prove discriminatory use of death sentences. Even
if so, it raises perhaps a far more difficult question in terms of explaining why blacks
dominate whites in the population of homicide offenders by a ratio of seven to one.
Another troubling statistic involves cross-racial homicides, one perhaps explaining
why death penalty opponents look to the race of the victim in asserting equal protection
claims. Id. When race or ethnicity of the victim is considered, the statistics show that
seventy-six percent of victims are identified as white, fifteen percent as black, and six
percent as Hispanic. These percentages may roughly reflect the breakdown of these groups
in the national population. See Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, The 2012
Statistical Abstract, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12sOOlO.pdf
(Tbl. 10: Resident Population by Race, Hispanic Origin, and Age: 2000 and 2009)
(indicating that in 2009, 244,298,000 residents of the U.S. were counted as "White Alone,"
39,641,000 were counted as "Black Alone," and 48,419,000 were counted as being of
"Hispanic Origin," and noting in addition that "Hispanics may be any race").
13. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994). Callins is the case in which Justice
Blackmun finally came to reject the use of the death penalty, announcing that he felt
"morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment
ha[d] failed." Id. at 1145.
14. Id. at 1153. The Court has been aware of possibility of racism in the imposition of
the death penalty since at least as early as AIdridge v. U.S., 283 U.S. 308 (1931), in which
the Court recognized the potential for racial prejudice to improperly influence the capital
sentencing decision in a prosecution of a "negro" defendant charged with the murder of a

RACISM IN CAPITAL SENTENCING

In fact, evidence of "the virus of racism" in the system
existed long before McCleskey was decided. In Swain v.
Alabama,15 for example, the Court rejected a challenge based on
evidence that no black had been seated as a juror in the county
in which Swain was convicted during the preceding twenty-five
years. 16
The Swain majority, confronted by evidence of this
apparent disparity in treatment of blacks in the jury-selection
process,' still declined to conclude that such evidence of
longstanding exclusion was sufficient to prove an equal
protection violation. Because peremptory challenges were not
exclusively under the control of prosecutors, but were also a
tactical tool used by counsel for the accused, defense counsel's
exclusion of some minority jurors essentially clouded the
evidence and prevented the Court from concluding that
exclusion of blacks from petit jury service could be exclusively

white police officer. Id. at 309. Defense counsel noted that in a prior trial, a "Southern"
venireperson had indicated that she might be influenced by the fact that a black defendant
was charged with the murder of a white person, and requested the trial court inquire into
possible racial prejudice on the part of prospective jurors. The trial court refused. Id. at
310.
The Aldridge Court reversed, id. at 315, citing a series of decisions rendered by
Southern courts authorizing inquiry into juror bias in cases involving minority defendants.
It also noted that the inquiry "as to the existence of a disqualifying state of mind has been
upheld with respect to other races than the black race, and in relation to religious and other
prejudices of a serious character." Id. at 313. Moreover, the Court recognized the
significance of racial prejudice in capital cases, explaining: "Despite the privileges
accorded to the negro, we do not think that it can be said that the possibility of such
prejudice is so remote as to justify the risk in forbidding the inquiry. And this risk becomes
most grave when the issue is of life or death." Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
15. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled in part, Batson v. Ky., 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
(overruling Swain only to the extent that its reasoning limited proof of discriminatory use
of peremptories to establishing a pattern and practice of discrimination over time).
16. Id. at 222-23.
17. Id. at 224. The majority conceded the theory underlying the equal protection claim:
If the State has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any jury in a criminal case,
the presumption protecting the prosecutor may well be overcome. Such proof
might support a reasonable inference that Negroes are excluded from juries for
reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on trial and that
the peremptory system is being used to deny the Negro the same right and
opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white
population. These ends the peremptory challenge is not designed to facilitate or
justify.

96
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attributed to state actors. 18 Swain held, then, that demonstrating
discrimination in the exclusion of blacks from petit jury service
required proof of not only a pattern of prosecutorial peremptory
challenges excluding minorities, but also proof that prosecutors
accused of using peremptories to discriminate on the basis of
race were actually engaged in a pattern and practice of using
peremptories for the purpose of racial exclusion.19
Over time, the Swain remedy for prosecutorial racism
proved unworkable, which finally led to the Court's recognition
20
of an arguably more usable remedy in Batson v. Kentucky.
Batson permits the party opposing the use of a peremptory
challenge to object and establish a prima facie claim by showing
that the strike was used to remove a prospective juror who is a
member of a cognizable racial or ethnic group. The proponent of
the strike must respond by offering a race-neutral explanation
for 1the strike. The trial court then determines whether to accept
it.

2

Had the McCleskey Court recognized the compelling
statistical evidence of disparity in the charging decisions of
prosecutors with respect to the death penalty-decisions
reflecting discretion exercised by prosecutors alone and so not
subject to an analysis that includes defense counsel's use of the
same strategies22 -would have necessarily resulted in a capital
defendant's submission of similar statistical evidence being
deemed sufficient to make out a prima facie case of racially
18. The majority concluded by acknowledging that

there has not been a Negro on a jury in Talladega County since about 1950. But
the responsibility of the prosecutor is not illuminated in this record. There is no
allegation or explanation, and hence no opportunity for the State to rebut, as to
when, why and under what circumstances in cases previous to this one the

prosecutor used his strikes to remove Negroes. In short, petitioner has not laid
the proper predicate for attacking the peremptory strikes as they were used in
this case. Petitioner has the burden of proof and he has failed to carry it.
Id. at 226.
19. Id. at 227-28.
20. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
21. Id. at 96-98. The Batson remedy was later extended to permit the prosecution-or,

in fact, any litigant in any jury trial-to challenge a peremptory apparently exercised on the
basis of race. See e.g. Ga. v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (extending Batson to prohibit

criminal defendant's exclusion of prospective jurors based on race or ethnicity); Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (extending Batson to exclusion of minority

jurors in civil cases).
22. See pp. 95-96, supra (discussing Swain).
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discriminatory use of capital sentencing. Instead, the McCleskey
Court offered no solution to the problem posed in that case-a
problem that logically leads to the conclusion that state actors
routinely exercise their discretion in capital sentencing to
discriminate on the basis of the race or ethnicity of the accused
or the victim.
As it did in Batson by addressing the inherent problem of
demonstrating prejudice in Swain, the Court, if genuinely
interested in addressing discriminatory application of the death
penalty based on racial or ethnic factors, would have long ago
realized the error of McCleskey. It would have moved to fashion
a new remedy allowing statistical evidence to be used in
establishing prima facie claims of discrimination in the charging
process and imposition of the death penalty. Yet the Court has
not been forthcoming, even though the use of comparative
statistical analysis would afford a workable way of addressing
the problems suggested-one might even say demonstrated-by
the obvious racial disparity in actual use of the penalty.
The Court's inaction means that the McCleskey barrier
continues to frustrate generalized challenges to racially
discriminatory use of the death penalty, demanding instead that
proof of discrimination be directly related to the prosecution of
the individual defendant. However, proving discrimination in
the individual case is virtually impossible unless the prosecutor
is prepared to admit bias in seeking the death sentence, so
McCleskey remains virtually an absolute bar to claims of racial
discrimination in the administration of the death penalty.
A. Consideringthe McCleskey Effect: Williams
The problem posed by McCleskey, a problem that would be
dramatically impacted by the Eighth Amendment analysis
advanced by Justice Douglas in Furman, is demonstrated by the
Arkansas capital prosecution of Frank Williams. The state
supreme court ordered a new sentencing proceeding for
Williams 23 because the jury failed to find that mitigating23. 2011 Ark. 534. The conviction and death sentence had been upheld on direct
appeal. Williams v. State, 902 S.W.2d 767 (Ark. 1995). Appellate counsel on the direct
appeal had been fined for failure to timely file the appellate brief. Williams v. State, 885
S.w.2d 679 (Ark. 1994) (imposing fine). It bears noting that in contrast to the issue of
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circumstances evidence had been presented at trial despite the

defense presentation of expert evidence about Williams's
troubled childhood and low IQ, and the fact that he had likely
been under the influence of alcohol and marijuana at the time of
the offense.2 4 This grant of relief followed lengthy postconviction litigation 2 and a well-argued and thoroughly
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude minority venirepersons
involved in Swain, which implicated the rights of those individuals to participate in jury
service in addition to compromising the accused's right to a fairly selected petit jury, the
issue presented in Williams is not complicated by defense counsel's contribution to the
disparity in treatment. The power to make discriminatory charging decisions lies
exclusively with the prosecution (with, in some jurisdictions, involvement of a grand jury).
Defense counsel is not involved. The ability to charge on a discriminatory basis thus lies
"wholly in the hands of state officers," in the language of the Swain majority. 300 U.S. at
227.
24. Williams v. State, 2011 Ark. 534. The court found that
[t]he Williams jury erroneously marked subsection D, despite the fact that
Williams had offered unrebutted evidence in mitigation through Mary Pat
Carlson, a licensed professional counselor, regarding the fact that he grew up in
a dysfunctional family with substance abuse as a primary area of dysfunction
and that he came from a violent background where his parents would get into
physical altercations with one another under the influence. Additionally,
evidence was presented that he was functioning with a low I.Q., understanding
things in society about as well as a nine or ten year old. Carlson opined that
Williams was alcohol dependent, abused cannabis, and had an antisocial
behavior problem. Carlson further opined Williams was under the influence of
both alcohol and marijuana on the night of the murder. It was her testimony that,
physiologically, he was not able to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and
conform it to the requirement of the law.
Id. at *5-*6 (footnote omitted).
25. Williams's post-conviction counsel (different from direct-appeal counsel, who was
also sanctioned, see supra n. 24) was ordered to show cause for his failure to timely file the
appellate brief from denial of relief by the trial court and was fined $250.00 for that failure.
Williams v. State, 25 S.W.3d 429, 429-30 (Ark. 2000). The court later denied all claims on
the merits. Williams v. State, 56 S.W.3d 360 (Ark. 2001). Although post-conviction
counsel raised constitutional challenges to the Arkansas capital sentencing scheme, these
were rejected as procedurally defaulted, not having been raised on direct appeal, but also
on the merits as being repetitious of claims previously decided adversely by the court.
However, it was necessary for these constitutional claims to be presented in the state
process in order for them to be heard in federal habeas, assuming that they were not
procedurally barred under Arkansas law. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
Williams's attempt to litigate constitutional claims in the federal habeas process
proved unsuccessful when, following denial of relief on his initial petition, his counsel
sought leave to amend his petition to raise additional issues, including a claim that his
execution was barred under Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304 (2006). The federal courts
concluded that the attempt to assert this new claim was procedurally barred as an improper
attempt to litigate a successive petition. Williams v. Norris, 461 F.3d. 999, 1000-01 (8th
Cir. 2006). Despite the constitutional prohibition against the execution of the mentally
retarded recognized in Atkins, the court refused on procedural grounds to consider the
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documented clemency petition that gained a favorable
recommendation from the state parole board,26 and occurred
only when the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized its own error
in failing to find error in its review of the death sentence. 27
Evidence developed by Williams's federal defenders shows
why reliance on statistical evidence focusing on capital
prosecutions in a single judicial district should be sufficient to
28
support a claim of disparity in use of the death penalty.
Williams relied on localized evidence that the death sentence
has been imposed in a racially discriminatory fashion in the
Arkansas judicial district in which he was sentenced29 because
merits of the claim-further evidence of the flawed system in which substantial
constitutional rights are sacrificed, not through knowing relinquishment by defendants, but
through the procedural failures of their lawyers. The Supreme Court eventually denied
certiorari once again. Williams v. Norris,_
U.S. _,
128 S. Ct. 81 (2007).
26. In his application for executive clemency, Williams, now represented by federal
defenders, pointed out that while the federal habeas court refused to consider the Atkins
claim, treating it as procedurally barred, it did order his lawyer to repay half of his
$10,000.00 fee. The district court also stated on the record that the attorney should no
longer be considered for court appointments. See Application for Exec. Clemency of Frank
Williams, Jr. at 31 (Ark. Dept. Correct. July 1, 2008) [hereinafter Williams Clemency
Petition] (copy on file with author).
27. Williams, 2011 Ark. 534 at *4 (characterizing its own failure to recognize the jury's
action in ignoring mitigating-circumstances evidence as, "[u]nfortunately, . . . an erroneous
finding by this court"); see also Ark. R. App. Practice--Criminal 10.
28. This disparate-treatment claim, along with an Atkins-based mental-impairment
claim, was presented in the Williams Clemency Petition. See Death Penalty Information
Center, News and Developments-Clemency, Upcoming Arkansas Execution in Doubt
because of Lethal Injection Problems and Clemency Recommendation, http://www.death
penaltyinfo.org/node/2423 (accessed July 14, 2012; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process). The Williams Clemency Petition was preceded by a favorable vote
from the Arkansas Board of Pardons and Parole. Id. (noting that "[t]he Board had received
petitions for clemency from 13 state, national, and international organizations and
developmental disabilities experts which concluded that Mr. Williams suffers from mental
retardation based on his sub-average adaptive functioning and the diagnosis of
psychological experts."). The execution in his case was stayed pending a civil suit brought
by death-row inmates challenging the Arkansas execution protocol; that action proved
successful, Hobbs v. Jones, 2012 Ark. 293 (holding that legislation delegating authority to
establish protocol for executions violated separation of powers), after the Arkansas
Supreme Court had already ordered a new sentencing proceeding in Williams's case. See
Hobbs v. Jones, 2012 Ark. 293 at *3, *29 n. 1.
29. The Williams Clemency Petition relied on research completed by the late David
Baldus and his associates, George Woodworth and Neil Allen Weiner. See David C.
Baldus, Neil A. Weiner & George Woodworth, Evidence of Racial Discriminationin the
Administrationof the Death Penalty: Arkansas Judicial Circuits8 & 8S, 1990-2005 (2008)
(unpublished mss.; copy on file with author) [hereinafter Discrimination in Arkansas].
Professor Baldus's similar research in Georgia provided the statistical support for the
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the five death sentences imposed in the Eighth and Eighth South
Judicial Districts from 1990 through 2005 were all imposed in
cases involving black defendants and white victims. 3° The
research also showed that during this period blacks were
charged in more than twice the number of cases eligible for
treatment as capital cases as were white defendants.31 Further, in
nine of ten cases in which black defendants were charged with
murdering white victims, capital murder charges were filed,
while capital charges were filed only forty percent of the time in
other cases eligible for capital treatment.
No white capital defendant was subjected to a capital
sentencing hearing over the eighteen-year period covered by the
fifteen-year study and the three post-study years, while black
defendants faced the death penalty in one of every four cases.
And those black defendants were eleven times more likely to
face the death penalty when the victim was white than when the
victim was black.33 Moreover, two-thirds of black defendants
charged with killing white victims during the period faced the
death penalty, while only three of fifty-four defendants in other
cases faced a potential capital sentence. And, in five of nine
cases in which black defendants faced the death penalty, they
were sentenced to death while no other death-penalty-eligible
defendant received the death penalty. 34 These results led the
report's authors to conclude that this ratio of death sentences to
death-sentence-eligible cases
would occur by chance less than
35
once in 10,000 instances.
Williams also presented evidence to rebut the suggestion
that his crime, which involved a single aggravating circumstance
(an alleged assault with a knife on a law enforcement officer
who was himself subsequently convicted of two federal felony
offenses after being indicted for filing false statements, fraud,

petitioner's arguments in McCleskey. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 284, n. 2 (citing David
Baldus, Charles Pulaski & George Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences:
An EmpiricalStudy of the GeorgiaExperience,74 J. Crim. L. & C. 661, 674 n. 56 (1983)).
30. Williams Clemency Petition, supra n. 26, at 38-39.
31. Id. at 39-40.

32. Id. at 40.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (citing Discriminationin Arkansas, supra n. 29, at 8).
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conspiracy, and money laundering),36 was more heinous than the
offenses committed by four death-penalty-eligible white capital
defendants who were not sentenced to death in the Eighth and
Eighth South Districts during the research period. 37 None of
these white defendants responsible for killing multiple victims
suffered the death penalty, while Williams was sentenced to
death upon his conviction for the murder of his employer, a
farmer who terminated his employment for "breaking a
tractor." 38 In fact, the only multiple-victim case during the
research period in which39 the death penalty was imposed
involved a black defendant.
The research also showed that in four of the six most
aggravated cases studied, black defendants received the death
penalty for killing white victims, while no death sentence was
imposed on a defendant of any race when the victim was
black.4 ° In fact, Williams was among the least aggravated cases
to appear in the research data, and his federal defenders argued
that the district-wide statistics compiled by the researchers
indicated that Williams would not have faced the death penalty
had his victim not been white. 4 1 Nevertheless, the compelling
statistical evidence of discriminatory charging could not have
satisfied the McCleskey requirement for proof that his capital
charge and resulting death sentence were the result of
discriminatory intent on the part of the prosecuting attorney.

36. Id. at 36 n. 10.
37. These were defendants who had
" committed at least three murders and had other violent felony convictions;

" doused three people with gasoline-killing two of them-after an argument
over $20.00;

* fatally shot an acquaintance and killed a witness, both in their early twenties;
and
* killed his wife and fifteen-year-old son for no apparent reason.
Id. at 42.
38. Williams, 902 S.W,2d at 768.
39. Williams Clemency Petition, supra n. 26, at 42.
40. Id. at 42.
41. Id. at 43.
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B. ComparativeAnalysis after Batson:
Miller-El and Snyder
The Court diluted Batson's power to combat racial

discrimination through the use of peremptory challenges in
Purkett v. Elam,42 upholding, per curiam, a finding that the
prosecutor's stated basis for exercising peremptory strikes

against black prospective jurors-that the length of their hair
and facial hair made them look "suspicious"-was an acceptable
"race-neutral" explanation for their exclusion. This prompted
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan, to complain:
Today, without argument, the Court replaces the Batson
standard with the surprising announcement that any neutral
explanation, no matter how "implausible or fantastic," even
if it is "silly or superstitious," is sufficient to rebut a prima
facie case of discrimination.4 3

Nevertheless, comparative analysis has proved useful in
assessing the reliability of trial court decisions accepting
prosecutors' explanations for peremptory challenges that
exclude minority jurors from capital juries, even in the wake of
the Court's retreat in Purkett. In both Miller-El v. Dretke44 and
Snyder v. Louisiana,4 5 the Court ultimately resolved the question

of prosecutorial intent in the defendant's favor by engaging in a
comparative analysis of otherwise similarly situated majority
and minority venirepersons, including focusing on the actual
questions propounded to the prospective jurors by prosecutors
during the voir dire process. 46 In these cases, objective review of

42. 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
43. 514 U.S. at 771, 775 (Stevens & Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted).
44. 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
45. 552 U.S. 472 (2008).
46. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241 (characterizing the prosecution's use of peremptories to
exclude ninety-one percent of prospective minority jurors as "remarkable," noting that
"[h]appenstance is unlikely to produce this disparity," and concluding that "if a
prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an
otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove
purposeful discrimination"); Snyder, 552 U.S. at 483-84 (comparing the similar situations
of a white member of the jury pool and a black member of the jury pool who each
expressed a desire to fulfill commitments outside the courtroom instead of serving on the
Snyder jury, assessing prosecutors' asserted reasons for challenging the latter but not the
former, and concluding that "it is hard to see why the prosecution would not have had at
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the disparate impact of state action resulted in a resolution that
takes account of the "race bias in the administration of the death
penalty" recognized by Justice Thomas in Graham.47 It is as a
result "hard to see why' 48 comparative analysis is apparently
acceptable in assessing prosecutorial decisions about using
peremptories to strike prospective jurors but apparently
unacceptable in assessing prosecutors' decisions about charging
defendants
with capital offenses and seeking the penalty of
49
death.
Miller-El and Snyder, in which the defendants both relied
on Batson,50 demonstrate that without comparative analysis, the
Court has been unable to prevent racial discrimination in the
selection of capital jurors. The Court's commitment to reliance
on state court fact-finding-typically conducted by the trial
judge who presided over the capital conviction and sentencing in
the first instance--compromises the efficacy of the Batson
51
remedy for racial discrimination in the jury-selection process.
Trial courts willing to tolerate apparent discrimination against
minority jurors in the prosecution's use of peremptory
challenges can hardly be expected to order relief when
acceptance of an arguably "race-neutral, 52 explanation for a
strike typically ends their inquiry and is then entitled to
deference in subsequent review of their decisions. The decisions
in Miller-El and Snyder remain powerful reminders that
deference to state trial court fact-finding may serve to insulate

least as much concern regarding" the prospective juror who was white as it expressed about
the prospective juror who was black).
47. Seep. 91, supra.
48. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 484.
49. See pp. 99-101, supra (discussing the comparative analysis advanced in Williams
and showing that evidence of this type should be sufficient to provide reviewing courts
with an objective basis for assessing the conduct of prosecutors, acting independently, in
disparate charging decisions that result in statistically significant differences in the use of
the death penalty based on racial or ethnic factors).
50. See 476 U.S. at 92-93 (recognizing need for revision of remedy for alleged
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by not requiring proof of systematic
discrimination in multiple trials, overruling Swain v. Ala., 380 U.S. 202 (1965)).
51. Id. at 97 ("We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir
dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors.").
52. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 772 (Stevens & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
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racial bias in the selection of capital trial juries and the
prosecution of capital cases from review.
II. UNDUE

DEFERENCE TO STATE JUDGES AND JURIES, AND TO
TRIAL COUNSEL, IN FEDERAL HABEAS CASES

A. Deference to State Trial Courts
As the preceding discussion indicates, comparative analysis
is seldom used in the trial courts, and those courts' reluctance to
employ it, combined with appellate courts' deference to both the
rulings of trial courts and the strategic decisions made by trial
counsel, often leaves death-sentenced defendants with no viable
means of challenging their sentences on grounds of racial bias in
the capital-trial process.
Unfortunately, federal habeas law not only permits these
limitations, but requires deference to procedural regularity even
though that deference can prevent merits consideration of even
53
the most critical constitutional claims in the habeas process.
Moreover, even failure by defense counsel to preserve error in
state proceedings bars consideration of a defaulted constitutional
claim, unless the defendant can show that counsel failed to
render the effective assistance guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. 54 Consequently, even when counsel's actions result
53. E.g. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (procedural default in state
proceedings, such as failure to timely appeal from adverse decision by post-conviction
court that results in state appellate court's refusal to consider federal constitutional claim
on the merits, bars federal habeas review); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977)
(failure to make timely objection resulting in procedural default of claim under state law
bars merits review of claim in federal habeas action unless petitioner can establish cause
for default and prejudice resulting from default).
54. Under Stricklandv. Wash., 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984), an ineffective-assistance
claim requires a showing that counsel's performance was defective and not the result of an
objectively reasonable strategy and also a showing that there is a reasonable probability
that but for counsel's defective performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. In Murray v. Carrier,477 U.S. 478 (1986), the Court held that counsel's
failure to preserve error will not satisfy the cause requirement under Wainwright v. Sykes,
and will not enable a reviewing court to avoid deference to state court procedural default
absent manifest injustice, like actual innocence, concluding that "[s]o long as a defendant is
represented by counsel whose performance is not constitutionally ineffective under the
standard established in Strickland v. Washington ...

we discern no inequity in requiring

him to bear the risk of attorney error that results in a procedural default." Id. at 488. In
Smith v. Murray,477 U.S. 527, 534 (1986) the Court also concluded that a tactical decision
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in default of a claim that the death sentence was imposed as a
result of racial discrimination-a claim touching the very heart
of the requirement that a capital sentence not be the product of
bias or prejudice-that procedural default insulates the claim
from federal habeas review.
The dual policies of deference to counsel's judgment in
exercising trial strategy and deference to the decisions of state
court judges (who are often elected and then subject to reelection, retention election, or recall) essentially commit the
ultimate decision on a significant constitutional claim to a judge
who is perhaps less likely to find a violation warranting relief
than is a Presidentially appointed, Senate-vetted federal judge
serving for life. Even if not predisposed toward racial bias, state
trial judges may be more likely to favor prosecutors and defense
counsel appearing regularly before them and less likely to set
aside convictions or death sentences imposed by jurors (who are
often voters in the judges' own communities), particularly in
cases involving the heinous crimes that are typically prosecuted
as capital offenses, and that can later be sensationalized in
campaign advertisements directed against sitting judges. The
system of deference firmly in place seems virtually designed to
ensure that death sentences will only be set aside with great
difficulty.
Moreover, the federal habeas statute makes it extremely
difficult to set aside a state death sentence because it can only be
set aside if the state court has rendered a decision "contrary to"
or reflecting an "unreasonable application of' Supreme Court
precedent, or if the state court decision was unreasonable in light
of the factual record.55 Thus, a state court decision may be
made by counsel resulting in procedural default of a claim in state proceedings, such as the
decision not to press a claim of error on appeal, does not establish "cause" for application
of a state rule of procedural default under Wainwright v. Sykes.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Westlaw 2012). The statute prohibits the grant of relief on a
federal constitutional claim that was adjudicated on the merits in the state courts unless the
state court decision:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
Id.; see also e.g. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 147 (2005) (holding that federal habeas
statute precluded relief based on an alleged infirmity in California capital sentencing
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incorrect, but still must be upheld on federal habeas. 56 And a

state court's reasonable application of a state rule of procedural
default to preclude consideration of a federal constitutional
claim on the merits will serve to bar its consideration in the
federal habeas process. 57 This requirement of deference to a
state court's application of a procedural default can only be
avoided in the58 extreme circumstance noted by the Court in
House v. Bell:

Out of respect for the finality of state-court judgments
federal habeas courts, as a general rule, are closed to claims
that state courts would consider defaulted. In certain
exceptional cases involving a compelling claim of actual
innocence, however, the state procedural default rule is not
a bar to a federal habeas corpus petition.59
The Court's posture of deference to state courts ignores the
historical truth revealed in Justice Thomas's observation in
Graham v. Collins with which this essay began. Racial
discrimination in the administration of capital punishment
prompted the Furman Court's intervention in the state deathpenalty process, 6 0 and the Court's continuing policy of undue
respect for state-court judgments rests on the illusion that it has
been effectively addressed.
The Court's deference to state courts' fact-finding and
application of state procedural-default rules serves the twin
goals of comity and finality, but at the expense of ensuring that
capital sentences are imposed without taint of racial
discrimination. For example, this deference explains why the
instructions because state court decision did not reflect incorrect or unreasonable
application of Supreme Court precedent).
56. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) ("In order for a federal court to find
a state court's application of our precedent 'unreasonable,' the state court's decision must
have been more than incorrector erroneous.The state court's application must have been
'objectively unreasonable."') (citations omitted; emphasis added).
57. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. 722).
58. 547 U.S. 518 (2006).
59. Id. at 522.
60. The death penalty remains most prominently used in Southern states and any
suggestion that racial discrimination has been completely addressed in those states is
simply false. But this is not to suggest that racial discrimination in the criminal justice
system is limited to the South. See e.g. Samuel R. Gross, Race, Peremptoriesand Capital
Jury Deliberations, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 283, 292-93 (2001) (describing racially
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in Philadelphia).
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federal courts refused to entertain the claim by now-executed
inmate Curtis Osborne 61 that his own attorney-who reportedly
referred to Osborne by saying "[t]hat little nigger deserves the
death penalty" in a conversation with another client-was
racially biased.62 Osborne claimed that the obvious racial bias
underlying this statement led his attorney to conceal the
prosecution's offer of a life sentence in return for his guilty plea,
while his lawyer responded that he had disclosed the offer to
Osborne, who rejected it. Despite Osborne's supporting
affidavit, neither the state nor federal habeas court ever
considered whether defense counsel had in fact made the
statement because the claim was raised in a successor petition
for post-conviction relief.63 The state court accepted counsel's

explanation that he had disclosed the offer and its holding barred
reconsideration of that finding as a matter of res judicata.
It is possible, of course, that Osborne's claim of racism
might have proved false had the supporting affidavit been tested
at an evidentiary hearing. It is also possible that, even if
counsel's racial slur was reported accurately, he might have
conveyed the plea offer to Osborne.6 5 Nevertheless, deference to
the state trial court's initial ruling insulated Osborne's death
sentence from review in the federal habeas process.

61. Osborne v. Terry, 466 F.3d 1298 (1 1th Cir. 2006).
62. Id. at 1316.
63. Id. at 1316-18.
64. Id. at 1318. The Eleventh Circuit explained the district court's deference to the state
court's fact-finding on this point:
The district court also found that the affidavit is not sufficient to rebut the State
court's factual finding based on Mostiler's clear testimony that he told Osborne
about the plea offer, that Osborne rejected the offer, and that Osborne never
wavered from that position. Accordingly, the district court denied Osborne relief
on these claims.
Id. at 1318.
65. Id. ("Even if the affidavit correctly recounts Mostiler's statements to Huey, it does
not establish that Mostiler failed to convey the plea offer to Osborne. Moreover, Osborne
presents no other evidence to support his claim that Mostiler's alleged racial animosity
affected his representation."). While it is true that Osborne's lawyer might have performed
effectively in actually conveying the plea offer to his client, the fact remains that use of
such language may give rise to a credible inference that his alleged inaction could be
attributed to racial animus, a claim never fully tested by evidentiary hearing in the case. Cf
Wisc. v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 482-86 (1993) (discussing the possibility that evidence of
use of racial slurs may in other situations be sufficient to warrant enhancement of a
sentence pursuant to a statute imposing greater punishment for "hate crimes").
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B. Deference to Trial Counsel's Decisions
Deference to trial counsel's explanations for decisions
made in preparation for trial or at trial may also insulate claims
of racial taint in the death sentence from federal habeas review.
For instance, executed Texas inmate Gary Sterling was
sentenced by an all-white jury that included a juror who
admitted in a post-trial interview and in testimony at the postthat he referred to African-Americans as
trial hearing
"niggers." 66 Sterling argued that trial counsel was ineffective in
'
his
not questioning
so.6 prospective jurors about racial bias, despite
do
to
right
Sterling's trial counsel explained that he found such inquiry
fruitless because jurors seldom responded honestly, but that he
assumed the juror in question, whom he described as a "middle
of the road" juror in the rural county where Sterling was tried,
probably held racist sentiments. Nevertheless, he thought the
juror would be favorable to the defense because he had
previously represented the juror on another matter. The federal
habeas court explained the thinking of trial attorneys Dunn and
Anderson:
At the habeas hearing, Dunn opined that [Juror W]
"probably is a racially prejudiced individual, but he is a fair
man" and "probably a middle-of-the-road juror for Navarro
County," where "there is a large sector of the public...,
both black and white, that are racially prejudice[d]." Dunn
made a strategic decision that [Juror W] would be a
favorable juror because of their prior attorney-client
relationship. Anderson also thought they were very pleased

to have [Juror W] on the jury because Dunn had
represented him in the past and knew him well. She

testified at the habeas hearing that, although a few years

66. Sterling v. Cockrell, 100 Fed. Appx. 239, 242-43 (5th Cir. 2004).
67. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986). The Turner Court held that in crossracial murders prosecuted as capital crimes, the potential for racial bias might taint a death
sentence imposed upon an African-American defendant, observing that "[flear of blacks,
which could easily be stirred up by the violent facts of petitioner's crime, might incline a
juror to favor the death penalty." Id. at 35; accordHam v. S.C., 409 U.S. 524, 526 (1973)
(characterizing the questioning of prospective jurors about racial bias as required by "the
essential demands of fairness" ensured by the Due Process Clause).
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had elapsed since trial, she was sure it was "a conscious
68
trial tactic" that they wanted him as a juror.

Whether or not trial counsel reasonably believed that Juror
W would have been a favorable juror, counsel's failure to
question prospective jurors about potential bias effectively
conceded the existence of racial prejudice among the jurors.
That prejudice should never have been permitted to influence
Sterling's all-white jury when it made the sentencing decision in
defendant charged with
a case involving an African-American
69
murder of a white victim.
Moreover, while the state and federal courts accepted
counsel's explanation of the decision not to voir dire prospective
jurors about racism as an objectively reasonable strategy-the
test for avoiding a finding of ineffectiveness 70 -deference to
counsel's judgment should also have forced the court's
consideration of counsel's more general observation about jurors
living in the county where Sterling was convicted and sentenced.
In characterizing Juror W as a "middle of the road juror" for
Navarro County, counsel necessarily implied that any jury panel
drawn from its citizens would be likely to include racially biased
jurors. The question not addressed by the courts' deference to
counsel's judgment about the level of racial prejudice in the
68. Sterling v. Cockrell, 2003 WL 21488632, *36 (N.D. Tex.) (internal citations
omitted).
69. In federal capital prosecutions, jurors are instructed that they may not consider the
race of the defendant or any victim as a factor in the sentencing decision. The controlling
statute provides:
(f) Special precaution to ensure against discrimination.-In a hearing held before
a jury, the court, prior to the return of a finding under subsection (e), shall
instruct the jury that, in considering whether a sentence of death is justified, it
shall not consider the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the
defendant or of any victim and that the jury is not to recommend a sentence of
death unless it has concluded that it would recommend a sentence of death for
the crime in question no matter what the race, color, religious beliefs, national
origin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim may be. The jury, upon return of
a finding under subsection (e), shall also return to the court a certificate, signed
by each juror, that consideration of the race, color, religious beliefs, national
origin, or sex of the defendant or any victim was not involved in reaching his or
her individual decision and that the individual juror would have made the same
recommendation regarding a sentence for the crime in question no matter what
the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or any
victim may be.
18 U.S.C. § 3593 (available at http://uscode.house.gov). No comparable instruction was
given at Sterling's capital trial.
70. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
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community in which Sterling was tried is whether any death
sentence imposed there in a case involving a black defendant,
particularly one charged with the death of a white victim, could
ever be free from the taint of that community's commonplace
racial prejudice. But until state courts abandon---or are directed
to abandon-such undue deference, this question will never be
answered.7 '
1II. SUBORDINATION OF SUBSTANTIVE RACIAL-DISCRIMINATION
CLAIMS TO PROCEDURAL CONCERNS: BUCK AND SALDANO

The exclusion of minority jurors from capital trials does not
describe the full extent of continuing questions concerning the
influence of racial bias in use of the death penalty. In other
contexts, evidence or suggestion of racial bias is often
disregarded or discounted by courts' reliance on procedural
default rules, typically those relating to trial counsel's failure to
properly preserve error. For instance, in Buck v. Thaler,72 the
Court denied certiorari on a claim that Buck's sentence was

71. Recently, a North Carolina case made headlines when a state trial judge reduced a
death sentence to life imprisonment, finding that the eighteen-year-old case was infected
with racism in the selection of the trial jury. See Campbell Robertson, Bias Law Used to
Move a Man Off Death Row, 161 N.Y. Times Al (April 21, 2012). The judge
acknowledged that the evidence of the defendant's guilt was unquestionable, but invoked
the relevant provision of North Carolina's Racial Justice Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A2011 (Westlaw 2009), to reduce the sentence from death to life without parole upon finding
extensive evidence of intentional discrimination. Unfortunately, that Act has recently been
amended by the North Carolina legislature to remove the provisions used in that case. See
Sarah Preston, North Carolina's Historic Racial Justice Act Gutted, http://www.aclu
.org/blog/capital-punishment-racial-justice/north-carolinas-historic-racial-justice-act-gutted
(July 3, 2012) (indicating that the North Carolina legislature overcame the governor's veto
of new legislation "repealing the provision that allowed defendants to file claims showing
statewide discrimination in sentencing and jury selection," and so removed the state's
short-lived legislative support for the use of statistical evidence to demonstrate systemwide racism) (copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
Legislative events subsequent to the decision in this case demonstrate the folly of the
Supreme Court's reliance on state actors-whether prosecutors, judges, or legislators-to
properly carry out federal constitutional commands. That approach presupposes the good
faith of every state prosecutor, trial judge, and state legislator, all working inside a deathpenalty system that has been compromised by the taint of racism since before Furman was
decided.
72. __ U.S. __
132 . Ct. 32 (2011); - U.S. _,
132 S. Ct. 69 (2011) (denying
application for stay of execution and petition for writ of certiorari); - U.S. -. , 130 S.
Ct. 2096 (2010) (denying petition for writ of certiorari to the Fifth Circuit).
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influenced by the prosecution's psychologist, who testified in
the sentencing phase that Buck's race-African-Americanrendered him more likely to commit acts of criminal violence in
the future, which is the heart of the capital sentencing question
in Texas trials. 73 Buck relied on Saldano v. Texas, in which
similar race-based dangerousness analysis offered through the
same expert had led to relief, based on the concession by the
Texas Attorney General that the conclusions of this expert
witness violated equal protection and due process. 75 Although
other minority defendants had obtained relief from their death

73. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 37.071(1) (Westlaw 2011) (requiring capital trial
jurors to make findings in response to interrogatories propounded during the sentencing
proceeding, at which the prosecution's case in seeking the death penalty requires proof of
the convicted defendant's "future dangerousness"). The statute provides, in pertinent part,
that "[o]n conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the
following issues to the jury: (1) whether there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 37.071(1)(b); see also Buck, 132 S. Ct. at 35 (Sotomayor &
Kagan, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that "future dangerousness" was "a
fact that the jury was required to find in order to sentence Buck to death.").
74. 530 U.S. 1212 (2000). On remand in Saldano, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
explained the unique circumstances of the case:
After we affirmed his conviction on September 15, 1999, the appellant
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The question for review
was, "Whether a defendant's race or ethnic background may ever be used as an
aggravating circumstance in the punishment phase of a capital murder trial in
which the State seeks the death penalty." The Attorney General of Texas filed a
response to the petition, in which he confessed that the prosecution's
introduction of race as a factor for determining "future dangerousness"
constituted a violation of the appellant's rights to equal protection and due
process.
Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 875-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
The state court initially addressed the authority of the Texas Attorney General to
make this concession. Because it held that the claim of constitutional error-the admission
of Dr. Quijano's opinion on the relationship between race and ethnicity and the propensity
of minority offenders to commit acts of criminal violence in the future-had not been
preserved at trial and had consequently been forfeited, 70 S.W.3d at 891, it found the
state's confession of error in the United States Supreme Court to be ineffective because it
was contrary to Texas law requiring preservation of error. Saldano obtained relief in
federal habeas corpus, however, because the Texas Attorney General declined to rely on
the defense of procedural default and the habeas court proceeded to find that admission of
the psychologist's testimony constituted constitutional error requiring relief. Saldano v.
Cockrell, 267 F. Supp. 2d 635, 642-43 (E.D. Tex. 2003).
75. Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 875. After the grant of federal habeas relief, Saldano was
again sentenced to death. That sentence was upheld on appeal. Saldano v. State, 232
S.W.3d 77, 82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Exparte Saldano, 2008 WL 4727540 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008) (denying post-conviction relief).
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sentences because of the same psychologist's race-determinative
conclusions, Buck was denied relief because his own trial
76
counsel had initiated discussion of Buck's race before the jury.
Justice Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Breyer,
explained in a statement respecting the denial of certiorari that
the claim of racial discrimination could properly be subordinated
to state procedural default rules and concerns about counsel's
failure to properly preserve error. 77 He pointed out that the
difference between the procedural context for the admission of
the psychological testimony in Buck and other cases involving
the same type of testimony lay in the fact that in the other cases
prosecutors had elicited the expert opinion based on the race
factor in their cases-in-chief during the sentencing proceeding:
Buck was tried for capital murder, and a jury convicted. He
was sentenced to death based on the jury's finding that the
State had proved Buck's future dangerousness to society.
The petition in this case concerns bizarre and objectionable
testimony given by a "defense expert" at the penalty phase
of Buck's capital trial. The witness, Dr. Walter Quijano,
testified that petitioner, if given a noncapital sentence,
would not present a danger to society. But Dr. Quijano
added that members of petitioner's race (he is AfricanAmerican) are statistically more likely than the average
person to engage in crime.
Dr. Quijano's testimony would provide a basis for
reversal of petitioner's sentence if the prosecution were
responsible for presenting that testimony to the jury. But

Dr. Quijano was a defense witness, and it was petitioner's
76. Justice Alito explained the difference in the disposition for Buck and those for the
other defendants who had obtained relief on the basis of the objectionable expert
testimony:
[T]he fact remains that the present case is different from all the rest. In four of
the six other cases, see, e.g., Saldano v. Texas, 530 U.S. 1212, 120 S. Ct. 2214,
147 L.Ed.2d 246 (2000), the prosecution called Dr. Quijano and elicited the

objectionable testimony on direct examination. In the remaining two cases, see
Alba v. Johnson, 232 F.3d 208 (C.A.5 2000) (Table); Blue v. Johnson, Civ.
Action No. 99-0350 (SD Tex., Sept. 29, 2000), while the defense called Dr.
Quijano, the objectionable testimony was not elicited until the prosecution

questioned Dr. Quijano on cross-examination.
Buck,__ U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. at 34 (statement of Alito, Scalia & Breyer, JJ., respecting
denial of certiorari) (emphasis in original).
77. Id. at 34-35 (statement of Alito, Scalia & Breyer, JJ., respecting denial of

certiorari).
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attorney, not the prosecutor, who first elicited Dr. Quijano's
view regarding the correlation between race and future
dangerousness.
Buck's death sentence was thus insulated from constitutional
challenge because of the trial strategy chosen by his lawyers.
The Saldano-Buck litigation sequence reflects direct use of
race as a capital-sentencing factor, a constitutional infraction
recognized even by the former Texas Attorney General in
Saldano, but also demonstrates the barriers imposed by federal
habeas practice and state preservation rules that often serve to
insulate claims of racial discrimination from relief. In Buck,
seven members of the Court voted to deny certiorari despite
Buck's claim that the admission of race-based conclusions as to
his propensity to commit acts of criminal violence in the future
impermissibly tainted his death sentence-a claim consistent
with the position taken by the Texas legislature in excluding
evidence of race in the capital sentencing determination.7 9
A majority of the Court was essentially willing in Buck to
subordinate the constitutional claim of racial bias in the
administration of the death penalty to procedural considerations
of deference to both state court reliance on procedural default
and trial counsel's strategy. 80 The same had been true below. In
rejecting habeas relief, the Fifth Circuit had explained:
Indeed, in the punishment phase of the trial, it was Buck's
defense counsel who argued for the admission of Dr.
Quijano's expert report into evidence, despite language in
the report suggesting that Buck's race is one factor that
might argue in favor of a finding of future dangerousness.
Buck and his counsel presumably made this strategic
determination because they believed that the potential
78. Id. at 33 (emphasis supplied).
79. Tex. Code Crim. P. Art. 37.071(2)(a)(2) (Westlaw 2012) ("[E]vidence may not be
offered by the state to establish that the race or ethnicity of the defendant makes it likely
that the defendant will engage in future criminal conduct.").
80. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan dissented from the denial of certiorari and, while not
prepared to order relief on the record before the Court, would have remanded for the Fifth
Circuit to reconsider asserted misrepresentations by Texas in resisting Buck's habeas
petition. Buck, 132 S. Ct. at 35 (Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). Their remand position, however, reflected concern for procedural fairness in the
disposition of Buck's claim, not an objection to the substantive question: whether a death
sentence tainted by racially discriminatory expert testimony can be legitimized by
procedural default.
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benefit of Dr. Quijano's ultimate conclusion-that Buck
was not likely to pose any future danger to society if he
were incarcerated-outweighed any risk of8 exposing the
jury to Dr. Quijano's less favorable opinions. '

The Fifth Circuit's characterization of counsel's strategy as
presumably shared by Buck is particularly interesting because it
necessarily suggests that Buck either initiated or acquiesced in
By presuming that Buck had been
counsel's approach.
involved in the development of strategy in eliciting the damning
testimony of Dr. Quijano, the Fifth Circuit seemingly attempted
to absolve itself of any responsibility for permitting Buck's
execution to proceed 83despite the taint of racial bias in the
sentencing proceeding.
Even assuming that the Fifth Circuit's presumption that
trial counsel and Buck jointly, or trial counsel at Buck's
instigation, deliberately offered Dr. Quijano's testimony, the
question of the legitimacy of a death sentence admittedly
81. Buck v. Thaler, 345 Fed. Appx. 923, 930 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that Buck's claim
would fail on the merits because defense counsel, not the prosecutor, had introduced the
issue of race in the proceedings) (emphasis supplied).
82. Imputing counsel's decisions to the accused is not uncommon in the resolution of
claims based on default, even though one might normally assume that it is counsel's
obligation to exercise strategically sound discretion in representing a criminal defendant,
including preservation of claims of constitutional error. See e.g. State v. Fudge, 206
S.W.3d 850, 858 (Ark. 2005) (alleging ineffective assistance in capital counsel's "failure to
include federal grounds in his motion for directed verdict, thereby foreclosing Fudge's
opportunity to present the claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding"). But the
presumption indulged by the Fifth Circuit hardly reflects the type of knowing and
intelligent waiver on the record warranting a finding that Buck waived his constitutional
right to be free from racial bias in imposition of his death sentence. Instead of presuming a
valid waiver, the Supreme Court's position since Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938),
has been that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights" and "'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."
Id. at 464-65 (internal quotation marks omitted). Waiver being the "intentional
abandonment of a known right," Wood v. Milyard, __ U.S. -, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1835
(2012); U.S. v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993), the presumed waiver of objection to
Quijano's inflammatory testimony should never have been permitted to trump the merits
unless the record clearly demonstrated that Buck understood the consequences of
presenting Quijano's testimony and acquiesced in counsel's development of that testimony
during the sentencing phase of the trial.
83. It is not clear, of course, that jurors actually relied on Dr. Quijano's opinion in
finding that there was a probability that Buck would engage in acts of criminal violence in
the future if he was sentenced to life in prison rather than death. Nor, in light of the
disposition in Saldano, is it unreasonable to assume that had Buck been granted federal
habeas relief, a new sentencing proceeding might have resulted in another death sentence.
See n. 74, supra (relating history of Saldano litigation).
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influenced by racial discrimination remains untouched by the
disposition in Buck. This elevation of process over substance
compromises the Court's commitment to the administration of a
racially fair death penalty. Justice Alito described Buck's
petition as one involving "bizarre and objectionable testimony,"
yet a majority of the Court refused to order further review in the
case.
IV. CONCLUSION: FURMAN'S SAD LEGACY

State policies of deference to state rules of procedural
default and to trial counsel's explanations for failure to
aggressively protect the rights of their clients serve to preclude
federal habeas courts from actively exercising jurisdiction to
address questions of racial discrimination that influence
imposition of a death sentence in individual cases. The Court's
expression of concern that death sentences not be tainted by
racial bias is, consequently, undermined by these policies, which
elevate process over substance with respect to this most serious
constitutional issue. And yet, it appears that individual Justices
are aware of the conflict.
Much as Justices Powell and Blackmun concluded after
years of experience that the administration of capital punishment
is often compromised by racial discrimination, Justices
O'Connor and Stevens have similarly expressed reservations
about the integrity of the capital-sentencing process. Justice
O'Connor's concern was particularly prompted by the number
of death-sentenced inmates eventually exonerated and the
uneven quality of capital counsel.84 However, she resigned from
84. See e.g. David Von Drehle, Death Penalty Walking, Time, http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,1699855-1,00.html (Jan. 14, 2008) (noting that Justice
O'Connor " told a group of Minnesotans not long ago that they should 'breathe a big sigh
of relief every day' that their state doesn't have the death penalty," while also pointing out
that Justice Powell "told a biographer that the vote he most regretted was the one he cast in
1987 to save capital punishment," and that Justice Stevens, "who as a new Justice in 1976
voted to restore capital punishment, now speaks of the 'serious flaws' in the system he
helped devise") (accessed Sept. 5, 2012; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice
and Process); see also e.g. Editorial, Justice O'Connor on Executions, 150 N.Y. Times A16

(July 5, 2001); Alan Berlow, Supreme Court Shocker, Salon.com, http://archive.salon.coml
news/feature/2001/07/04/oconnor/index.html (July 4, 2001).
Justice O'Connor's long-held and consistent support for the capital sentencing
process also drew sharp criticism. See e.g. Edward Lazarus, Justice O'Connor's Death
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the Court without acting directly on these concerns. But Justice
Stevens made his concerns public in his concurring opinion
85
upholding the execution protocol under attack in Baze v. Rees.
Among other points he raised in criticizing continued reliance
on capital sentencing as a punishment option-the most
important being the execution of an innocent defendant 86 -he
noted that
[a] third significant concern is the risk of discriminatory
application of the death penalty. While that risk has been
dramaticallyreduced, the Court has allowed it to continue
to play an unacceptable role in capital cases. Thus, in
McCleskey v. Kemp,... the Court upheld a death sentence
despite the "strong probability that [the defendant's]
sentencing jury... was influenced by the fact that [he was]
black and his victim was white." 87
Justice Stevens's Baze opinion also cited Evans v. State,88 in
which the Court let stand a decision by the Supreme Court of
Maryland "affirming a death sentence 'despite the existence of a
study showing that the death penalty is statistically more likely
to be pursued against a black person who murders a white victim
89
than against a defendant in any other racial combination.'
Nevertheless, he concurred in the Baze Court's judgment rather
than rejecting capital sentencing as a matter of Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment dictate, as Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Douglas, Blackmun, and Powell all did.
While the experiences of past Justices argue for
reconsideration of the death sentence because of its potential
misuse as an element of racial oppression-misuse nearly
impossible to quantify or detect in any individual case-their
conclusions rejecting capital punishment, whether as a matter of
constitutional interpretation or public-policy analysis, are not
shared by any sitting Justice. The current Court's unanimous
acquiescence in the constitutional acceptance of capital
sentencing reflects a continued failure to recognize the damage
Penalty Regrets-and Responsibility, http://writ.news.fmdlaw.comlazarus/20010710.html
(July 10, 2001).

85. 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
86. Id. at 85-86 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
87. Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
88. 914 A.2d 25 (Md. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 835 (2007).

89. Baze, 553 U.S. at 85 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
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done to the integrity of the criminal-justice process when race is
a factor in the decision to impose the ultimate punishment.
Challenges to death sentences couched in terms of the
Eighth Amendment's protections, rather than as matters of equal
protection governed by Fourteenth Amendment protocol, may
offer the best hope for addressing the Court's acquiescence in
this persistent racism. 90 It was, after all, reliance on the Eighth
Amendment that led the Court to reject existing capitalpunishment schemes in Furman only a year after upholding state
death-penalty statutes in McGautha v. California. 1 It may well
be that a re-examination of the values that led to Furman could
lead to a new approach to addressing the problem of race bias in
capital sentencing, one resting in the heart of the Eighth
Amendment protection against the imposition of cruel and
unusual punishments.

90. See Andrews, 802 F.2d at 1267 (noting that a "pattern of discriminatory or
otherwise arbitrary sentencing decisions in capital cases" could support an Eighth
Amendment claim).
91. 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated, sub nom Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972);
see e.g. Malcolm L. Stewart, Justice Blackmun's Capital Punishment Jurisprudence, 26
Hastings Const. L.Q. 271, 276 (1998) (characterizing shift from McGautha to Furman as
made "abruptly"). The typical explanation for the apparent shift in the Court's position
focuses on the fact that the claim raised in McGautha was predicated on Fourteenth
Amendment due process grounds, while Furman rested on the cruel and unusual
punishment prohibition contained in the Eighth Amendment. See e.g. Jonathan Bridges,
Hooding the Jury, 35 U.S.F. L. Rev. 651, 673-77 (2001) (discussing McGautha, Furman,
and Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153 (1976)); Robert Taylor Lemon II, Student Author,
ConstitutionalCriminal Law-The Role of Mitigating Circumstances in Considering the
Death Penalty, 53 Tul. L. Rev. 608, 611 n. 24 (1979). This analysis is supported by the
Court's own explanation in Gregg:
McGautha was not an Eighth Amendment decision, and to the extent it
purported to deal with Eighth Amendment concerns, it must be read in light of
the opinions in Furman v. Georgia. There the Court ruled that death sentences
imposed under statutes that left juries with untrammeled discretion to impose or
withhold the death penalty violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments....
While Furman did not overrule McGautha, it is clearly in substantial tension
[W]e adhere to Furman's
with a broad reading of McGautha's holding ....
determination that where the ultimate punishment of death is at issue a system of
standardless jury discretion violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 n. 47.

